INDEX

Website updated to 20 November 2007 (including full transcripts of interviews with Group Fraud & Security here and here and letter of dismissal)

Part 1 - Uncovering a scandal (Equitable Life, Lloyds TSB, Scottish Widows and the Financial Services Authority)
   
Part 2 - The turn of the screw (Reporting to management, suspension, investigation, dismissal)
   
Part 3 (this page) - A banner with a strange device (Follow-up actions)

Part 3 explains what I have done since I was dismissed to follow up:

  • the original whistleblowing matter;
  • the victimization by my management resulting from the whistleblowing;
  • the failure of Scottish Widows' auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers) to qualify the 1998 accounts of that company on account of the whistleblowing matter.
   
17. Referral to Chairman, Chief Executive, Director of Group Risk Management and Chairman of the Audit Committee
18. Referral to City of London Police, Independent Police Complaints Commission, Professional Standards Unit and the Information Commissioner
19. Referral to Financial Services Authority, Members of Parliament, the Treasury Select Committee and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman
20. Referral to Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW)
20.1 My complaint of victimization
20.2 My complaint that Mr. Scrivens had failed to properly investigate my concerns about the Scottish Widows demutualization
21. Skeletons (or the ghost of Enron)
22. Conduct unbecoming
23. The Daily Telegraph
24. The BBC
25. Freedom to Care
26. The Institute of Internal Auditors
27. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland
28. Lothian & Borders Police and the Procurator Fiscal
29. The Accountancy Investigation & Discipline Board
30. The European Parliament (The Committee on Petitions and the Committee of Enquiry into the Crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society)
31. Public Concern at Work
32. Private Eye
33. Personal consequences
34. Looking ahead
35. And you? What will you do?
   

17. Referral to Chairman, Chief Executive, Director of Group Risk Management and Chairman of the Audit Committee (Top of page)

On my suspension in December 2002 I referred this matter to the Chief Executive of Lloyds TSB (Peter Ellwood), the Director of Group Risk Management of Lloyds TSB (Michael Green), who was Alan Hubbard's manager, and the Chairman of the Audit Committee of Lloyds TSB (Professor Ewan Brown), all of whom declined to look into the matter. When Peter Ellwood and Michael Green brushed me off (these sorts of people have staff who are adept at keeping customers and other annoying people well away from them), I pursued the matter with Professor Brown since it was clear to me that as a Chartered Accountant and as Chairman of the Audit Committee he at least had a clear duty to act.

Ewan Brown - a man of iron integrity - I don't think.

Professor Brown refused to intervene on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for him to become involved in the bank's investigatory or disciplinary procedures and that I should provide further evidence relating to the Scottish Widows demutualization. This was in spite of the fact that:

You will notice a curious (or perhaps not so curious) double standard here. The bank pursues preposterous allegations (eventually found to be unsubstantiated) made against a relatively junior member of staff (myself) with alacrity by initiating an investigation by Group Fraud & Security, yet absolutely refuses to lift a finger to investigate extremely serious allegations against its directors, supported by clear facts and made by a Chartered Accountant in their own internal audit department who was acting on the advice of the Ethics Advisory Service of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAEW).

18. Referral to City of London Police, Independent Police Complaints Commission, Professional Standards Unit and the Information Commissioner (Top of page)

In early 2003 I also reported this matter to the City of London Police since it seemed to me that Alan Rennie, Roger Cooper, Howard Monks and Alan Hubbard had committed a criminal offence under the Protection from Harassment Act (the Act is very short and the definition of 'harassment' is crystal clear - see sections 1 and 2) in that false allegations had been against me in the knowledge that I was recovering from a heart attack and was suffering from stress, that these allegations had been pursued for almost a year (through two further suspected heart attacks and an angioplasty) and that I had eventually been sacked in clear breach of the bank's own rules (this was at a later stage of course). The police refused to act on the grounds that the Harassment Act applied only to stalking, an assertion that is patent nonsense (as confirmed by the decision of the House of Lords, the highest court in the UK, in Majrowski v. Guy's and St. Thomas' NHS Trust on 12 July 2006 - in addition, two local councillors were arrested under the Act by the police at around this time for interrupting a council meeting) - see also here. I referred the matter to the Police Complaints Authority and the matter ended up in the hands of Superintendent Peter Moore of the Professional Standards Unit of the City of London Police. He refused to pursue the matter citing legal advice* which he refused to show to me. I applied for access to this legal advice under the Freedom of Information Act. This request was refused by the police and I appealed to the Information Commissioner in May 2005.

*This legal advice was apparently to the effect that the 'final act' of dismissing me did not amount to harassment. This statement is a cunning way of avoiding the issue since the Protection from Harassment Act, section 7(3), defines harassment as a 'course of conduct' involving at least two occasions. Therefore one 'occasion', including an act of dismissal, can NEVER be harassment! The statement that the 'final act' of dismissing me did not amount to harassment is therefore (legally) correct but ignores the fact that the harassment I complained of continued for over a year, as stated above. Snakey!

19. Referral to Financial Services Authority, Members of Parliament, the Treasury Select Committee and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (Top of page)

The Financial Services Authority, Members of Parliament and the Treasury Select Committee

In early 2003 (letter dated 19 January) I also reported the matter to the FSA and when this produced no result (or rather mere evasion) I referred the matter to my then local MP (Member of Parliament), Sir Archie Kirkwood, a Liberal. He forwarded letters to and from the FSA but studiously avoided taking a stand on the issue. I eventually wrote to him saying he was 'the most expensive postbox in history' and gave up as I was clearly making no progress. In early 2004 I moved to another parliamentary constituency.

'I enclose the reply I have now received from the FSA about the wording of the demutualization document.

I received your E-Mail of 16th March. You are quite at liberty to write to the Clerk of the Treasury Committee pressing the Committee to carry out an enquiry into this matter. The Committee are already aware of my request that they should do so.

Yours sincerely,

Alan Beith'

The reply that Alan Beith referred to is a letter dated 29 March from Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, FSA, which states as follows:

'In my letter of 26 July 2005, I referred you to Scottish Widows' Demutualisation and Transfer Policyholder Circular (Part IV), published on 19 November 1999, several months before the final Equitable ruling. The document sets out the details of the demutualisation and transfer, including the terms for the Additional Account. Page 23 (under the heading 'Contingencies') says:

"The contingencies allocated to the With Profits Fund are any additional costs of meeting guaranteed benefits on Transferred Policies allocated to the With Profits Fund and any unexpected liabilities which arise in the future but relate (with certain exceptions) to the operation of the Society and its subsidiaries prior to the Effective Date, including those arising as a result of the SIB pensions review and tax liabilities on pre-Transfer transactions."

I hope that this is helpful.'

Well, this is helpful in the sense that we have finally (after 3 years) pinned the FSA down on the precise wording which they claim 'generally made clear' to policyholders the existence of a GBP1.5 billion contingent liability in respect of GAR policies at the time of demutualization. The question is, of course, whether the statement on page 23 does actually make clear, in accordance with relevant accounting standards (i.e. FRS 12*), the nature and extent of the contingent liability and the director's assessment as to the likelihood that the contingency would crystallize; in other words, having read the statement would a policyholder understand:

  • that Scottish Widows had a contingent liability of GBP1.5 billion in respect of GAR policies at that time?
  • that if the Equitable Life case, then before the Court of Appeal, went against Equitable Life then the GBP1.5 billion put aside by Scottish Widows in the 'Additional Account' would not be paid to ordinary policyholders as stated on page 23 of the Demutualization and Transfer Policyholder Circular of 19 November 1999 but would be paid to GAR policyholders instead?
  • what the assessment of the directors of Scottish Widows was as to the likelihood of the liability crystallizing?

The answer to these questions is, of course, a resounding 'No'. As I had already pointed out to Alan Beith, and as the FSA themselves are well aware, the wording on page 23 falls so far short of adequate disclosure that it amounts to positive concealment. No reasonable person would or could dispute this point.

*Note that FRS 12 applies to financial statements, that is sets of accounts. Nonetheless, financial statements are designed to present a true and fair view and it therefore follows that any financial-type document which is supposed to present a true and fair view should comply with Financial Reporting Standards (FRS). It is for those who seek not to comply with FRS who need to justify their position. FRS 12 is therefore the 'yardstick' by which the adequacy of the disclosure of the contingent liability in respect of GAR policies should be judged.

Dear Mr. Lee,

I refer to your letter dated 13 September. You say in that letter that 'the Treasury Committee made a decision at its first meeting that it would not investigate individual cases'. May I refer you to:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmtreasy/272/27206.htm

where you will find a report titled 'Select Committee on Treasury Tenth Report, Equitable Life and the life assurance industry: An interim report'. Paragraph k) of the 'Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations' states that 'Equitable Life failed to explain to their policyholders the full implication of Lord Woolf's judgment. The FSA should therefore consider whether the assessment made by Equitable Life, and indeed by themselves, of whether the eventual House of Lords ruling could have been predicted, was justified, especially given Lord Woolf's judgment (paragraph 37).' This paragraph, as well as others, make it quite clear that the Committee did investigate the Equitable Life affair, in the context of the life assurance industry, and in fact the conduct of the FSA in relation to the Equitable Life affair, and that there is therefore no reason whatsoever why the Committee cannot also investigate the Scottish Widows demutualisation, in the context of the life assurance industry, and particularly the question of whether Scottish Widows failed to properly explain the nature of its GAR liability to policyholders (or the Court of Session) during the demutualisation process, as well as the conduct of the FSA in relation to the Scottish Widows demutualisation and other demutualisations as well. In short your reply is either deliberately misleading or a bare-faced lie.

I intend to pursue this matter either via the appropriate ombudsman or via judicial review or both. I will be grateful if you could copy this E-Mail to the Chairman of the Committee and ask him to respond.

May I draw your attention to:

http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section22/chapter_c.html

where you will find some relevant information on misconduct in public office. I would classify deliberately lying to a member of the public (who has referred the matter to the Committee on the recommendation of his M.P.) on your part in the context of such a serious matter to be misconduct in public office.

You will find a copy of your letter of 13 September and of this E-Mail on:

http://www.happywarrior.org

Yours sincerely,

Graham Senior-Milne

[Note: What has actually happened here is, as far I can see, as follows. It appears that at the beginning of every new parliament each committee decides on the scope of its activities. The Treasury Select Committee, it appears, did indeed make a decision not to investigate individual cases, even though it had done exactly that in the past (such as in the Equitable Life case referred to above for instance). So why on earth would they make such a decision? How can they possibly decide that no individual case that might come before them in the future would justify investigation? Clearly, what has happened is that the Committee decided (or at least the majority of members - given that the Labour Party has an in-built majority as the ruling party) that the Equitable Life case came close to revealing some very nasty facts indeed, in fact precisely those facts (i.e. the GBP 15 to 20 billion GAR scandal) that are the subject of this paper. We cannot discount the possibility that the decision not to investigate individual cases was made precisely to avoid a possible investigation into this matter. In fact, I believe that this is the case.]

The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman

20. Referral to Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) (Top of page)

On 6 September 2004 I made a formal complaint (ICAEW ref: 66818) against Martyn Scrivens, Director of Group Audit, to the Professional Conduct Directorate of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAEW), of which Mr. Scrivens is a member. There were two elements to my complaint:

a). Mr. Scrivens never asked to talk to me directly;

b). Mr. Scrivens cannot have obtained a sufficient explanation of my concerns from my management because the only time that I had discussed my concerns with my management was at the initial meeting with Roger Cooper in 2002 (see section 9. above) when I had only explained my concerns in outline and had not referred to detailed evidence, such as the Demutualization and Transfer Policyholder Circular of 19 November 1999;

c). Mr. Scrivens relied on the unsupported verbal assertions of the external auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, when he should have considered the fact that PricewaterhouseCoopers had issued an unqualified audit report on the accounts of Scottish Widows for the year ended 31 December 1998 (i.e. it made no mention of the contingent liability of GBP1.5 billion) and that this was in spite of the fact:

i). that Equitable Life had announced its plans to cut bonuses on GAR policies in January 1998;

ii). that on 9 September 1998 Ernst & Young (Equitable Life's auditors) had discussed the implications of this decision at a meeting with Equitable Life and that a potential exposure in respect of GAR policies of up to GBP1.5 billion had been identified at that meeting;

iii). that if Ernst & Young were aware of a contingent liability on the part of their audit client, Equitable Life, in September 1998 then PricewaterhouseCoopers should also have been aware of a contingent liability of a similar nature on the part of their audit client, Scottish Widows, at the same time;

iv). that the Equitable Life court case started with an originating summons in the High Court on 15 January 1999 before PricewaterhouseCoopers' audit of the 1998 accounts of Scottish Widows can possibly have been concluded (in fact the audit opinion in the 1998 accounts is dated 2 March 1999, almost two months later), meaning that the GAR issue was in the public domain before PricewaterhouseCoopers 'signed off the accounts'. Note also that the audit report on the 1999 accounts is dated 16 February 2000, the month after the Court of Appeal ruling in the Equitable Life case, at which point, according to the ruling, the GBP1.5 billion GAR liability crystallised into an actual liability (but, incredibly, still no mention in the accounts);

v). that the fact that the directors of Equitable Life considered it necessary for the GAR issue to be determined by the courts clearly demonstrates that they did not consider the likelihood of the crystallization of that liability to be 'remote' (logically if they had obtained legal advice to the effect that the crystallization of the liability was a remote possibility, which is the only situation when material contingent liabilities do not have to be disclosed in the accounts, then the matter would not have been taken to court);

vi) that, in any event, the fundamental accounting principle of prudence (combined with the significance of the matter i.e. in plain language, if the liability crystallised then Scottish Widows was bust) should have led PricewaterhouseCoopers to ensure that the existence of this GBP1.5 billion contingent liability was brought to the attention of policyholders in the 1998 accounts. The critical question here is whether the policyholders, as owners of the business, would have been happy for the auditors not to tell them of such a thing (would you, as the owner of a business run by others, a board of directors, be happy if the auditors did not tell you of the possible bankruptcy of that business? It's a simple question - with a simple answer. More worrying, would you be concerned if, in spite of the myriad of standards and rules churned out by the accounting/auditing profession, the auditors can not tell you about such a matter and get away with it?);

vii). that in view of the above and the fact that these contingent liabilities later crystallised, there were (and are) possible grounds for a legal claim against PricewaterhouseCoopers on the basis that they should have qualified the 1998 accounts (and the 1999 accounts of course, but that's another issue) of Scottish Widows (Equitable Life actually sued Ernst & Young over the GAR issue in February 2003, some 4 months after I first reported the matter to PricewaterhouseCoopers and fully 10 months before I was sacked; thus Mr. Scrivens should have been 'put on enquiry' by the fact that Equitable Life were suing Ernst & Young over the GAR issue - but the 'little grey cells' moved not a millimetre - apparently) and that, for this reason, Mr. Scrivens should have considered the possibility that PricewaterhouseCoopers were unlikely to say anything that could be taken as an admission of liability on their part. On this basis it was incumbent on Mr. Scrivens to obtain further evidence from other sources.

viii). That if the facts were sufficient to cause concern on my part as to PricewaterhouseCoopers' independence then they were certainly sufficient to do the same for Mr. Scrivens.

20.1 My complaint of victimization (Top of page)

With respect to my complaint of victimization, the Investigation Committee (who eventually considered the matter on 5 July 2005, some 10 months later) declined to pursue my complaint on the grounds that it was effectively an allegation of unfair dismissal and that such matters are 'reserved' to Employment Tribunals or the Courts, that is outside the ICAEW's jurisdiction, that is the ICAEW cannot investigate such matters. What I actually complained of was that Mr. Scrivens conduct amounted to 'victimization of another Chartered Accountant who had raised valid concerns in a proper manner as recommended by the Ethics Advisory Service [of the ICAEW]'; there was no mention of unfair dismissal though I did say that I had been sacked in clear breach of the bank's own rules. The Investigation Committee's argument runs (if you can follow the 'hall of mirrors' logic) that if the matter is outside the ICAEW's jurisdiction then Mr. Scrivens is not liable to disciplinary action under ICAEW rules. If Mr. Scrivens is not liable to disciplinary action under the ICAEW rules then this means that there is no indication that Mr. Scrivens 'may have become liable to disciplinary action' under section 9.3 of the ICAEW's Disciplinary Bye-laws* and so the Investigation Committee ruled that my complaint was technically not a complaint at all! This neatly prevents my complaint being referred to the independent Reviewer of Complaints, for example, since if something is not a complaint it cannot be referred to the Reviewer of Complaints!

The question, as far as I can see, is a very simple one, namely 'Is it against ICAEW ethical principles to victimize a whistleblower? Yes or No?' If the answer is 'Yes' then the ICAEW should investigate the matter.

*Bye-law 9(3) states that 'In these bye-laws any facts or matters which -

(a) have come to the attention of the head of staff under paragraph (1) or otherwise and

(b) indicate that a member, a firm or a provisional member may have become liable to disciplinary action under these bye-laws or the Investigation and Discipline Scheme or the Joint Disciplinary Scheme,

are referred to as a "complaint".'

20.2 My complaint that Mr. Scrivens had failed to properly investigate my concerns about the Scottish Widows demutualization (Top of page)

With respect to my complaint that Mr. Scrivens had failed to properly investigate my concerns about the Scottish Widows demutualization, Ray Farren, of the Professional Conduct Directorate, wrote to me on 21 September 2004 that 'the question of whether the conduct of Mr. Scrivens is wanting in the handling of this issue is a matter for the board of directors to consider'. I replied in an E-Mail dated 10 February 2005 that:

'Your second point that 'the question of whether the conduct of Mr. Scrivens is wanting in the handling of this issue is a matter for the board of directors to consider' is nothing short of preposterous since the matter which Mr. Scrivens failed to investigate is a misdemeanour (and possible criminal offence) by the directors themselves. The directors are hardly likely to insist that Mr. Scrivens investigate their own misdemeanours!'

The matter was not considered by the Investigation Committee at their meeting on 5 July 2005 but was withdrawn due to 'clarification of a procedural issue'. After I had made further submissions I was eventually informed in a letter dated 21 March 2006 (18 months after my initial complaint) that the papers were about to be prepared for submission to the Investigation Committee.

21. Skeletons (or the ghost of Enron) (Top of page)

On 28 July 2005 I made a further complaint to the ICAEW relating to Martyn Scrivens's involvement, as a partner of Andersens (of Enron fame), in a major financial scandal in Australia, the HIH Insurance Group scandal. Andersen were auditors of the accounts of HIH for 2000, which showed that HIH had A$939 million in assets, five months before it collapsed with an estimated shortfall of A$5.3 billion. It was estimated that the loss resulting from the takeover of FAI, where Martyn Scrivens was engagement partner, amounted to at least A$591 million, which loss was suffered directly by policyholders, that is ordinary people. The HIH scandal resulted in a public enquiry during which Martyn Scrivens's conduct was criticised in no uncertain terms by the judge as the following article reveals:

Andersen was misled, but sloppy work didn't help
By Elisabeth Sexton
April 17 2003

The auditors of HIH and FAI were misled by company executives, but also made mistakes and did insufficient work before signing the accounts, according to the final report of the royal commission.

Justice Neville Owen said he did not subscribe to the theory that "whenever a company fails its auditor must have been at fault".

However, the commission's detailed examination of the way Arthur Andersen dealt with selected accounting issues revealed occasions where the firm "did not obtain sufficient audit evidence to support its conclusions", the judge said.

"In many instances I found that adjustments ought to have been made to the accounts in relation to matters that were the subject of inquiry."

Andersen's approach to the audit in 1999 and 2000 was "insufficiently rigorous to engender confidence as to the reliability of HIH's financial statements".

The judge said there was a perception Andersen was not independent of HIH. This arose because three former Andersen partners sat on HIH's board, because an audit partner was removed after meeting directors without management's knowledge and because there was pressure on the Andersen partners to maximise fees from non-audit work.

But he found no reason to conclude that the firm's independence was "in fact" compromised.

He made a similar finding in relation to external actuary David Slee, who advised HIH on the funds it needed to set aside to meet future claims.

While Mr Slee's work "produced results that were less than optimal" and some of his dealings with HIH were "less than satisfactory", the actuary "struck me as a strong-willed person who was unlikely to succumb to pressure", the judge said.

In relation to reinsurance contracts used by FAI to overstate its profits in June 1998, the judge said Andersen was misled by executives of FAI and its reinsurers.

But Andersen was aware that FAI had previously engaged in controversial one-off transactions to boost profits. Analysis by two Andersen auditors, Martyn Scrivens and Daniel Vanderkemp, "cried out for legal advice or at least discussion with FAI management", the judge said. "They did not take either step."

On HIH's failure to set aside sufficient funds to meet future claims, the judge said: "In my view, Andersen knew that HIH's provision for liability as at December 31, 1999 and June 30, 2000 was problematic."

The firm knew HIH was exposed to claims which were not booked as liabilities in the accounts and "it would have been better had Andersen taken steps to ensure that the unbooked exposure was booked.

"At the very least, the process of setting provisions would have been advanced had the existence, size and significance of these exposures been brought clearly to the attention of the audit committee. Andersen did neither."

In 2000, when FAI was wholly owned by HIH, its financial statements falsely boosted its capital by $200 million, the report said.

This was achieved by following a suggestion made by Andersen partner John Buttle. The judge found Mr Buttle did not contribute to the way the $200 million was described in the accounts and thus was not involved in any breach of the law.

"Nevertheless the accounting treatment he advised was plainly wrong," the judge said. By actively participating in such endeavours, he "allowed himself to be drawn deeper into the company's affairs than was wise in the circumstances".

This story was found at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/16/1050172656698.html.See also Vol. 2 Chapter 14 of the report at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/Chapter%2014.HTML.

'The following reasons were given by the Committee:

1. The report makes clear that the judgement of Mr. Scrivens was not unreasonable given that he was not a lawyer, and that there was no duty upon him to consult a lawyer.
2. The 'criticism' was not part of the findings but a passing comment in the body of the report and, therefore, according to the report Mr. Scrivens "emerges entirely free of any adverse implications".
3. No adverse finding has to date been given by the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board.'

My response to this is as follows:

1. The ICAEW's 'Guide to Professional Ethics' (the single most important document produced by the ICAEW) lays down 5 fundamental ethical principles. Fundamental principle 3 – 'Competence' states that 'A member should undertake professional work only where he has the necessary competence required to carry out that work, supplemented where necessary by appropriate assistance or consultation'. This lays a specific duty on members to seek appropriate assistance (e.g. legal advice) where they do not have the appropriate degree of competence. Clearly, members are expected to know when they do not have the appropriate degree of competence.

It is quite clear, on this basis, that either the Investigation Committee do not know the fundamental ethical principles of their own institute, in which case they are incompetent, or they do know the fundamental ethical principles of their own institute, in which case they are lying.

Here as a reminder for the Investigation Committee are the Fundamental Principles of the ICAEW:

Fundamental principle 1 – “Integrity”

A member should behave with integrity in all professional and business relationships. Integrity implies not merely honesty but fair dealing and truthfulness. A member’s advice and work must be uncorrupted by self-interest and not be influenced by the interests of other parties.

Fundamental principle 2 – “Objectivity”

A member should strive for objectivity in all professional and business judgements. Objectivity is the state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task in hand but no other.

Fundamental principle 3 – “Competence”

A member should undertake professional work only where he has the necessary competence required to carry out that work, supplemented where necessary by appropriate assistance or consultation.

Fundamental principle 4 – “Performance”

A member should carry out his professional work with due skill, care, diligence and expedition and with proper regard for the technical and professional standards expected of him as a member.

Fundamental principle 5 – “Courtesy”

A member should conduct himself with courtesy and consideration towards all with whom he comes into contact during the course of performing his work.

Note also that section 6.2 of the ICAEW's 'Additional Guidance on Ethical Matters for Members in Business' states that 'Circumstances that may threaten the ability of members to perform their duties with the appropriate degree of competence and performance include... insufficient experience, training and/or education'. Section 6.3 states that 'The significance of the threats should be evaluated and, if they are other than clearly insignificant, safeguards should be considered and applied as necessary to reduce them to an acceptable level. Safeguards that may be considered include... consulting, where appropriate, with... independent experts'.

2. With regard to the statement that Mr. Scrivens 'emerges entirely free from any adverse implications', this is taken from a passage in the official report on the HIH scandal